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In the first place this paper considers the monetary politics of Eurosystem. Secondly, the 
monetary politics strategy of the European Central B nk (ECB) is analysed, emphasizing the 
target of price stability and that this has been achieved in the European Union. As a result it 
is concluded that the European Monetary Union is not an Optimum Currency Area. The 
Union’s labour market is not an integrated and co-operative one. There exist, in fact, deep 
rooted differences between the labour markets of the countries in the Union, which do not 
permit work mobility or wage flexibility. There is another factor supporting this thesis, which 
is the impossibility of turning to tax transfers to c ntrast unemployment due to the drop in 
demand. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the discretion left to the member States in terms 
of fiscal policy, but it is important, above all, that the countries in the Union respect the rules 
set up by the Stability and Growth Pact.  
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      This study deals with the Eurosystem’s (1) monetary policy and the role of the 
European Central Bank. The policy of a common monetary unit began the 1st of 
January 1999, when the 12 countries in the Union gave up control over their 
currencies to a higher institution, the ECB. The ECB chose the strategy of a single 
unit of currency, which would permit the attainment of efficient results for the Union 
and the creation of price stability (an objective dfined by the EU Treaty). Even 
though the ECB is an independent body, as Mr. Padoa –Schioppa sustains, one 
nonetheless cannot speak of a: “(…)monopoly (…). Today, on the other hand, the 
Eurosystem is an archipelago of (...) the actual configuration of the Eurosystem is 
unsustainable in the long term because it is riddle with contradictions” (Padoa–
Schioppa, 2004).  In any case, it must be stressed, that what has rendered the 
monetary unit policy efficient has been the introduction of the euro. The original idea 
was to create, through the single currency, a wide internal European market and to 
facilitate commercial transactions. The single currency has therefore permitted 
meeting the objective of an internal area without boundaries which the European 
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Union set for itself in the 1986 Common Act. Thanks to the euro, European citizens 
have more opportunities in terms of consumption andsavings while for businesses 
there are greater prospects of growth, even if it is necessary to be able to take 
advantage of the changes of the Economic system in which they operate.  
Lastly, one need note that the Economic and Monetary Union will not only foster the 
creation of a stable macroeconomic context, thanks bove all to the stability of prices, 
but will also determine new challenges, which are:  
1) The necessity for an appropriate mix between monetary and fiscal policies; 
2)  making the product and job markets more efficient.  
      Therefore, the fundamental objective of the Economic and monetary union is 
the creation of an efficient and stable area.  
                
 
2. Which monetary policy for the ECB? 
 
         On the day after the birth of the European Central Bank and the consequent 
centralisation of the monetary policy decisions on a higher level, the debate between 
the economists on which monetary policy strategy was better, and above all which 
would be the more in accordance with the realities of the European Union, reopened. 
      The outlining of the policy followed by the National Centralised Banks was 
anything but homogeneous, due to the fact that in the post-war period two models of 
centralised banks emerged, the Anglo-French model on one side and the German on 
the other. In the Anglo-French model, the goals of the centralised bank are: price 
stability, the stabilisation of the economic cycle, maintaining a high rate of 
employment, financial stability. While in the German model, there is only one main 
objective, which is price stability. Between the two models, the ECB has undertaken 
the framework of the Bundesbank. The success of this model can be explained by two 
factors. The first is connected to the success of the Monetarian school of thought1 (2), 
which became dominant as of the 1980s; the second to the strategic position assumed 
by Germany in the process of forming the EMU. According to the German authorities, 
the entrance into the Monetary Union would have meant accepting an inflation greater 
than the one within. To avoid this risk and therefo succeed in stabilising inflation, 
the ECB should have aimed at the stability of prices (3). The ECB today recognises 
price stability as its sole monetary policy objective and as an intermediary objective, it 
uses the mass of currency (the monetary mass is M3)- 4. In short the ECB retains it 
advantageous that the rate of growth of the mass of money compatible with the 
inflationary objective (which cannot go above 2 %) cannot grow beyond the 
quantitative reference value (in 1998 the quantitative reference value was fixed at 
4.5%). This quantitative reference value was calculted using the well-known 
equation: MV=PY and considering, on one side, the relationship between currency 
and prices and, on the other, gross national product and rate of circulation.   
With: 
M, meaning money or currency; 
V, meaning the speed of circulation (its rate uses th  average period.); 
P, meaning prices (referring to the IAPC index, created by Eurostat); 
Y, meaning the gross national product (its rate uses th  average period). 
   It is nonetheless necessary to specify that in the period between 1999-2002 
the rate of growth of the monetary mass was above the reference value. Therefore not 
                                                
 
 
only does the monetary mass considered by the ECB not represent an explicit target, 
but the role performed by this pillar in the monetary policy strategy is not even clear.  
           In hopes of better understanding the approach taken by the ECB, discussion 
will be limited to two points which regard respectively: 
1) the role given to monetary policy by the ECB in 1998;  
2) the new role, specified, by the ECB, in 2003 (5). 
      At this point in the analysis, one must ask on what principles did the ECB base its 
decisions on monetary policy in 1998? 
      In 1997, the IME indicated the following strategies: monetary targeting and 
inflation targeting. In truth, the ECB chose a strategy which included el m nts of both 
options. Therefore, according to several writers (Buti and Sapir, 1999), “the ECB’s 
strategy of monetary policy does not follow in dogmatic fashion either monetary nor 
inflation targeting but includes elements of both. The outline proposed can be 
interpreted as a simultaneous targeting of currency and inflation ”. If, therefore, in 
economic literature there appears an evident dichotomy between monetary targeting 
and inflation targeting, in the real world there exists a “quasi-equivalence” b tween 
the two strategies. In fact, this vision sustaining that: “(…) the difference between 
monetary and inflation targeting is insignificant” was made, beforehand by the IME, 
and later by the ECB.  
      Nevertheless, if the ECB in 1998 had indicated he key elements of its 
monetary policy strategy, that is: “ To maintain price stability, the ECB’s governing 
has decided to adopt a monetary policy strategy which will be based on two key 
elements: (1) A primary role will be given to the currency; this will be signalled by 
the announcement of a quantitative reference value for the growth of a ample 
monetary mass.(…)(2)In parallel with the analysis of monetary growth in respect to 
the reference value, an important role in the strategy of the Eurosystem will be 
assigned to an evaluation with ample breathing space for the prospects of price 
trends (…). This evaluation will be made using a vast ssortment of economic 
variables (…)”2. In 2003 the ECB’s governing Council revisited this approach, 
introducing the following innovations:     
1) the change in the definition of price stability. In fact, the inflationary objective of 
average period which was “positive but below 2%”, will be “below but close to 
2%”; 
 
2) a lesser importance to the monetary variables in the context of monetary policy 
decisions. 
Therefore, in May 2003, the ECB makes its decisions  monetary policy after 
having analysed the conomic variables, while the monetary variables serve to 
confirm the conclusions which emerge from the analysis of the economic 
variables. These changes although considered important, in actual fact, do not 
modify the principal objectives of the ECB. 
 
 
3. The asymmetrical effects of a common monetary policy 
 
            As of 1999 the economies of the countries in the EMU ought to be somewhat 
synchronised, as they have a common currency and a common management over 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, the management itself of the common monetary policy 
                                                
 
 
can have asymmetrical effects. The cause of this is ascribable to the various market 
structures presented by the member states, to the various employment rates and to the 
various rates of inflation. All this also implies differing reaction mechanisms in each 
state.  
          For example, demand inflationary shocks, originally only at a local level, are 
transferred from country to country and influence all of the Union with varying times 
and ways based on the structure of intra-European commercial relations and also upon 
the different capacities to respond, of the single national productive apparatuses. The 
Shocks which determine appreciation and depreciation of the euro, in respect to other 
currencies, have an asymmetrical impact on the mass request of the various countries 
in the Union following the major or minor opening of each economy to extra-
European exchanges.  
         Another reason for asymmetry in the transferring of monetary impulses is 
determined by the weight, differing from country to c untry, of the national debt. For 
example, restrictive measures aggravate in greater or l sser respect the budget of each 
country, this depends on the degree of accumulated debt and, therefore, on the extent 
of the additional burden which each state must tolerate due to the increase in interest 
rates. In conclusion, the economic operators in formulating the economic expectations 
will have to hold into account the present situation, a common monetary policy which 
transfers asymmetrically from nation to nation. More specifically, in light of the 
eventuality of monetary restrictions, the operators will expect (in the context of the 
stability Pact) consequent tax restrictions, more ponounced in countries with a 
greater debt, and consequently they will see growth expectations lower once again. 
 
4. Is the European Monetary Union an Optimum currency area? 
 
           At this point in the analysis one must ak if the European Monetary Union is 
an Optimum currency area.   
           The theory of the Optimum currency area (OCA) comes from Robert Mundell 
in 1961. An Optimum currency area offers a system where exchange rates are fixed 
and therefore no longer susceptible to variations, a d therefore, persists in time also in 
the presence of asymmetrical shocks. To bring an Optimum currency area into the 
discussion the following conditions must be present: 
1) mobility of factors,  
2) wage flexibility, 
3) a centralised budget.  
         The mobility of factors and wage flexibility. Presuming the presence of an 
asymmetrical shock, which hits two countries A and B, the international demand of 
goods in country A will increase, while in country B it will decrease. An increase in 
production, the need for labour, income, consumption and the positive sales of current 
accounts will occur in A, while in B, there will be a drop in production, higher 
unemployment and a deficit in current accounts. To re-stabilise the balance, if work 
mobility persists, the workers in country B need only move to country A where there 
is a need for labour. Thus, in country B, the problem of unemployment disappears, 
subsidies will not increase and at the same time the problem of current accounts is 
solved (the workers in country B thanks to subsidie will buy foreign products even in 
the presence of a drop in production). In country A, there will not be any inflationary 
pressures as wages will not increase, furthermore the increase in production and of 
revenue will determine an increase in imports leading to the reduction of current 
account overflow. If instead of work mobility, wage flexibility is present, the 
 
asymmetric shock which hits the two countries can be eliminated by reducing salary 
rates in B and increasing them in A. The drop in wages in B will lead to a reduction in 
production costs, the country will then be more competitive, thanks to the lower prices 
and will re-stabilise the balance of payments. In A the increase in wages will 
determine the increase in prices, thus, the country will be less competitive and the 
balance of payments will balance itself out.  
   A centralised budget. The last solution to re-stabilising the balance betwe n 
the two countries, according to the theory of the Optimum Currency Area, would be 
through taxes, or rather fiscal transfers, would be us d by country B to eliminate the 
negative effects on employment, due above all to the drop in demand. 
      In the absence of mobility of labour and wage flexibility, and of a centralised 
budget, the balance would be regained thanks to a flexible exchange rate, with a 
depreciation in the exchange rate in B and appreciation in A (6) 3.  
       The advantages and disadvantages brought by the introduction of the euro in 
the common market can be examined in relation to the theory of the Optimum 
Currency Area. 
The greatest advantage will be the creation of a more efficient common 
Market, both because there is no longer the risk of exchange rates, and because there 
are fewer conversion fees due to the use of different currencies.  
    It is important to point out that this advantage was mentioned by the 
Commission in 1990 in the document, One market, one currency, which sustains that 
in the European Union, during the 1980s, the transaction costs due to the presence of 
different national currencies added up 0.5% of the GNP (European Commission, 
1990). 
    In regards to the disadvantages, economic literature on the theory of the 
Optimum Currency area lingers on those derived from the presence of shocks which 
interest single states. Since the labour market in EU countries is not flexible, there is 
no elevated mobility of production factors, just as there is no price or wage flexibility. 
The shock cannot be reabsorbed by these mechanisms. Nor will a new equilibrium 
due to transfers of a fiscal nature be possible. In truth, this last solution would only be 
possible in the presence of a centralised budget within the Union, which would 
involve less discretionary fiscal policy. 
    Therefore, from the previous analysis, it can be concluded that the European 
Monetary Union is not an Optimum Currency Area. The Union’s labour market is not 
an integrated and co-operative one. There exist, in fact, deep rooted differences 
between the labour markets of the countries in the Union, which do not permit work 
mobility or wage flexibility. There is another factor supporting this thesis, which is 
the impossibility of turning to tax transfers to contrast unemployment due to the drop 
in demand. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the discretion left to the member States 
in terms of fiscal policy, but it is important, above all, that the countries in the Union 
respect the rules set up by the Stability and Growth Pact.  
    
 
5. Closing remarks 
 
      In conclusion, an evaluation can be made of the monetary policy put into effect by 
the ECB. The ECB has a single objective: price stability (art. 105 of the TUE), which 
it tries to attain through a precise strategy on monetary policy. A strategy based on 
                                                
 
 
two pillars: the first regarding the fixing of the quantity of currency; the second pillar 
regards the analysis of certain indicators, included among these are, wage and price 
trends, yield curves, and the trend of the euro’s exchange rate. Through analysis of the 
two pillars, the monetary authority decides on the corrective measures to be taken. It 
is therefore clear that the ECB has given the currency a fundamental role, as it is able 
to guarantee the stability of prices. Therefore, the ECB’s actions tend to contrast 
inflationary pressures. Furthermore, to render the ECB’s actions more efficient, it 
handles the monetary policy in absolute independence, onetheless their activities 
have been kept visibly transparent as of 2000 by publishing their decisions in the 
Monthly Bulletin. It is also necessary to comment on monetary analysis. According to 
the directions of the ECB’s governing council, the monetary mass M3, as of the 
second half of 2004, shows a rising trend, in large part determined by the low level of 
interest rates. In fact, one must recall that the governing council has left the ECB’s 
interest rates of reference unvaried, choosing to maintain the offered minimum rate 
applied to the principal refinancing operations of the Eurosystem at 2%, the interest 
rate on refinancing operations at 3% and on deposits care of the central bank at 1% 
(BCE, 2005). These choices made by the governing Council are explained by the fact 
that it does not see significant inflationary pressure  in the area of the uro, and 
therefore, historically low interest rates favour economic growth. But the scenario 
outlined is not free of risks. Just as the increase of the M3 has favoured the growth of 
liquidity, this could lead to risks in the stability of prices mid term. Therefore a 
watchful eye on the part of the Council is requested. 
 Lastly, one must recall that not only the ECB, with its choices, but also the euro can 
contribute to the growth of the Union. In fact, the introduction of the single monetary 
unit has taken away from the member states the possibility to decide monetary policy 
autonomously and to confront asymmetrical shocks manoeuvring the exchange rate. 
This has therefore obliged them to turn to policies lying on the supply side and to take 
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U radu se prvenstveno razmatra monetarna politika Europske unije (EU). Analizira se 
strategija monetarne politike Europske središnje banke (ESB), s naglaskom na cilj stabilnosti 
cijena i njegovo postignuće. Autor zaključuje da Europska Monetarna Unija (EMU) nije 
optimalno valutno područje. Tržište rada Europske unije nije integrirano i meñusobno 
povezano. Štoviše prisutne su značajne razlike izmeñu tržišta rada pojedinih zemalja članica 
Unije, koje su prepreka mobilnosti radne snage u fleksibilnosti nadnica. Tu tezu potvrñuje 
činjenica da je uslijed pada potražnje onemogućeno oporezivanje transfera za nezaposlene. 
Stoga je nužno smanjiti diskrecijska prva zemalja č anica u pogledu fiskalne politike, pri 
čemu je iznad svega važno da zemlje č anice Europske Unije poštivaju pravila postavljena 
paktom stabilizacije i rasta. 
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